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EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES
ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, Volume I. Edited by Klaus
Hopt. Berlin, West Germany: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1982. Pp.
viii, 262. $51.
At a time when corporate mergers and acquisitions dominate the American economic scene, it is appropriate to compare the approaches of other
industrialized countries to the problems posed by this form of business activity. In European Merger Controls, Klaus Hopt presents a collection of
legal and economic analyses of the merger control systems in several European countries, and of the European Economic Community (EEC), that
should interest both students of comparative law and practitioners of international law.
The articles collected by Professor Hopt note that, until recently, most
European nations did not perceive a threat from excessive economic concentration. Although the trend toward economic concentration has been
evident for several decades (pp. 155-57), most European governments actually favored this practice. Lawmakers in France (pp. 104-05), Great Britain
(p. 47), and Germany (pp. 73-74), among others, believed that large enterprises contributed to efficiency and helped maintain a competitive edge in
world markets. Not surprisingly, the anti-merger legislation adopted in Europe during the 1960's and 1970's reflects the strong philosophical undercurrent that "bigger is better." Consequently, the book maintains that
much of the European anti-merger legislation contains procedural and substantive weaknesses.
The articles note three common problems in this legislation. First, the
criteria used to investigate the legality of a merger are often ill-defined. 1
Second, the procedural steps used to invalidate a merger often favor the
merging enterprises over the government investigators.2 Finally, most of
1. Throughout the text the commentators note the amorphous standards that are used to
test the legality of a merger. In Great Britain, for example, a merger cannot be invalidated
unless it is against the "public interest." Although the British merger control law lists several
factors to be considered when assessing the "public interest," such as whether the merger will
promote competition, reduce costs, and maintain employment, pp. 57-58, this list is merely
illustrative. The author of the article on the British experience admits that "in practice the
statutory guidelines were never considered strictly and members of the [Monopolies) Commission in the final analysis would utilize a large measure of intuition." P. 195.
The British system can be compared with the German merger control law which has a
different procedural structure but leads to a similar public interest evaluation. The first phase
of a German merger investigation is strictly legalistic and looks to the size of the merging
enterprises and the potential for market domination. Pp. 79-80. However, even if a merger is
declared illegal, the decision can be appealed to the Federal Minister of Economics who then
can exempt the merger if the "public interest" in general justifies the merger. P. 81. The
French, p. 116, and Swiss, p.130, commentators also criticize the imprecision of the standards
used to test the validity of mergers in their countries.
2. The procedural devices that favor the merging corporations over the investigative body
include placing the burden of proof on the government to show that the merger is against the
public interest, p. 195, and making certain political decisions on mergers virtually nonreviewable by the courts, p. 8 I.
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the statutes contain escape clauses that may permit the merger even if it is
found to be illegal.3
Given these weaknesses, it is not surprising that most of the commentators in European Merger Control conclude that the merger control legislation in their respective countries is largely ineffective in practice. For
example, one commentator notes that in Britain, few of the eligible mergers
are investigated, let alone invalidated (p. 46). Another article concludes
that Swiss legislation has become ineffective due to the many exceptions
that have "perforated" the original intent of the law (p. 128).4 On the other
hand, the German merger control system is rated as a qualified success because it serves as a deterrent to mergers and acquisitions by the largest corporations (p. 96). The German system has the advantage of clear criteria
and legal presumptions which lead to investigation and prima facie invalidation of a merger (pp. 79-80). Since these criteria include the size of the
merging enterprises and the resultant market share, large corporations face
rigid scrutiny and are thus deterred from engaging in much potential
merger activity.
Interestingly, although the European nations surveyed have been
largely ineffective in controlling economic concentration in the industrial
setting, some countries have been able to control other mergers for
noneconomic reasons. For example, the French (p. 120) and the British
(p.49) have stringently controlled newspaper mergers because of the threat
they see to freedom of expression. This experience demonstrates that at
least some of the European nations can implement effective anti-merger
legislation given a real political or popular commitment.
Hopt's collection allows the reader to compare merger control legislation not only among European nations but also between the individual
countries and the EEC. Merger control has been a part of the EEC since
the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of 1951 (p. 249). This
treaty was followed in 1973 by a comprehensive proposal for merger control5 (p. 182) which has bogged down in a bureaucratic morass and may
never be finally approved (p. 184). Until the national laws are strengthened
or a comprehensive community-wide merger control law is enacted, the European Court of Justice will continue to control unacceptable mergers by
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant
position (pp. 174-75).
From an American perspective it is not surprising to find European
3. The defenses available to justify a merger that would otherwise be illegal vary from
country to country. For example, a merger in France that is harmful to competition can be
justified if the effect of the merger is to increase efficiency or productivity and thereby contributes to "economic and social progress." P. 117. In Britain, p. 55 and Germany, p. 92, there is
also a defense available for an anti-competitive merger that increases efficiency. These defenses have thus far been rejected in the United States. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). But see 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW§ 1016 (1980)
(arguing that the efficiency defense should be available).
4. The author of the article on the Swiss Cartel Act cites one example of exceptions that
reduce the effectiveness of the Act. The Cartel Act provides that interference with competition
is lawful when it is warranted by an "overriding legitimate interest" and does not excessively
interfere with free competition. P. 128.
5. For the full text of the proposed EEC merger control law, see pp. 253-62.

1144

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:1142

lawmakers facing a great many difficulties with their relatively new merger
control laws. The antitrust/merger control area has been among the most
complicated in American jurisprudence and is continually evolving. In
fact, the current difficulties facing the European countries are reminiscent
of the American experience in the early years of the Clayton Act. 6
The editor of European Merger Control succeeds in his basic goal. His
collection of articles addresses the concrete problems of merger control in
Europe from several perspectives and provides the reader with an overview
of the political and legal problems facing policymakers in Europe.7 The
presentation permits readers to compare current legislation and actual practice under the acts, to discern trends for the future of merger control in
Europe, and to draw parallels to the American experience. Finally, the articles cite many sources, and contain bibliographies and the texts of several
European merger control laws which furnish the reader with a starting
point for further investigation of the vast literature on the subject.
The articles in European Merger Control delineate the common practical
and theoretical problems that face the European nations in their attempts to
control economic concentration. Until these nations accept the principle
that competition is an end in itself, however, there will be little effective
merger control in Europe.

6. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, 576-675 (1977).
For a collection of articles reviewing the recent history of section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
effect of the 1950 amendments, see 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1391, 1391-1469 (1982).
7. Volume II of Professor Hopt's collection, GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAWS,
presents more specific studies of particular consolidations in Germany, France, Great Britain,
Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the EEC. Several selections in Volume II appear in French.

